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ABSTRACT.  
 We want to investigate the various dimensions and constitutive problems of 
what a research designated as “formal epistemology” would be. The interest of such 
questions is related with the possibility or not of getting a privileged point of view or 
axis of research (that of the “formal”), that would afford the facts and problems 
tackled by precise (regional) epistemology of theories (for example, in physics) a 
better grasp at their wealth and variety ; it is hoped at the same time to hold the main 
structural lines organizing them according to some comprehensive intelligibility, more 
unifying and synthetic. Such a point of view would eventually allow a better 
mastership on the changes required in organizing the various knowledges, putting 
emphasis on their main directions, drawing up a rational inventory of them, and 
perhaps anticipating others. 
 We deal first with the “thought of changes” that any concern to the form cannot 
omit, as the meaning of forms is bound to contents, that are themselves submitted to 
constructions and modifications. We examine thenafter the notion of “epistemic 
operation” as instrument for creating new forms, at the theoretical and meta-
theoretical levels. We subsequently analyze the characteristics of the form and of the 
formal and their relations to contents of knowledge, together with the notion of object, 
considering as well their dependence on the decision of a subject and on conventional 
choices. We finally inquire about the link between “epistemic operations” specified as 
above and algorithmic functions for knowledge statements, and we emphazise the risk 
of reductionism that a naturalistic conception of representation entails. 
 
REDUCED ABSTRACT.  
We ponder about the kind of problems and perspectives of a “formalized 
epistemology”, by considering the advantages than one can get from a concern with 
the “formal”, with its structural orientation, that would favour comprehensive, 
unifying and synthetic, intelligibility. We confront this perspective with that of the 
changes in knowledge, considering the relation between form and meaning for 
knowledge contents, and examine the notion of “epistemic operation” as instrumental 
for creating new forms, at the theoretical and meta-theoretical levels. Actually, the 
notions of form, of formal and of object are not independent of the problem of a 
subject that decides on conventions and choices. “Epistemic operations” might 
suggest a link with “algorithmic functions” for knowledge statements, that themselves 
entail the risk of reductionism in a naturalistic conception of representation. 
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1. 
  
INTRODUCTION.  
 
 The expression “formal epistemology” covers a variety of possible 
definitions, and is widely open to interpretations
1
. One conceives it, intuitively, as 
oriented by a concern to theoretical forms, to their meaning and their scope, for a 
given area of knowledge or with regard to the relationships between different 
fields of knowledge as well. We actually intend here not so much to give a precise 
definition of “formal epistemology” than to focus on some problems that would 
be characteristic of this kind of investigation and to underline the latter's interest 
and limits. We therefore admit from the start some vagueness in the definition, in 
order to avoid limitation inside too narrow and artificial bounds : the question 
being, actually, to explore what it could be, resonably speaking.  
 Let us begin by circumscribing our project. It is not intended here to 
establish a kind of “morphology of the mind” such as that planned three quarters 
of a century ago by Ernst Cassirer in his beautiful work The philosophy of 
symbolic forms
2. Cassirer extended in it his former inquiry on the “structure of the 
thought” as manifested “in mathematics and natural sciences”, which he had 
expound in Substance and function
3
 : he went on in the new three volumes book 
through the analysis of language, of mythical thought, and of the phenomenology 
of knowledge
4
. In any event, the idea that scientific thought is expressed through 
symbolic forms, as any other area of human thought, from its “infrastructure” to 
the “architectonic organization” of the superstructure that constitutes science5, 
while it is aat the same time oriented towards the real world, this idea will remain, 
for us, a fundamental inspiration
6
.  
 Questioning forms and formal problems, when one deals with precise 
sciences, leads in general to emphasize implicitly some current aspects of the 
                                            
1
 The following reflexions have benefited from exchanges and discussions inside the working 
group entitled Centre d'études pour la synthèse d'une épistémologie formelle (CeSef, Paris), 
animated by Mioara Mugur-Schächter. I acknowledge the friends and colleagues of this group for 
the rich debates we had. A first version in french has already been published : Opérations 
épistémiques et épistémologie formelle. Contribution à l’étude des opérations épistémiques dans 
les théories scientifiques, Principia (Florianopolis, Br.), 3, 1999 (n°2, dezembro), -.  
2
 Cassirer [1923-1929]. 
3
 Cassirer [1910]. 
4
 Subjects treated, respectively, in each of the three volumes of The philosophy of symbolic forms. 
5
 Cassirer [1923-1929], vol. 3, p. 13-14. 
6
 This idea has helped us in the orientation of other previous studies, in particular our La matière 
dérobée (Stealing matter), on the conceptions of contemporary physics (Paty [1988a]).  
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present scientific theories, with an endeavour to show how they are characteristic 
in this respect. We do not want, however, let ourselves be restricted to mere 
structural and static features, when our interest is directed, in particular from a 
comparative perspective, toward the movement by which these “formal” aspects 
are established, and is also impulsed by wondering how others could eventually be 
settled in the future. If we would restrict ourselves to examine only the 
formalizations of recent knowledges, we would be in danger to “lose the prey for 
the shade”, and to retain merely a “logically reconstructed” and schematic view of 
the sciences, to the detriment of their living reality and, so to speak, of the very 
substance or flesh of those knowledges, whose contents and forms, that were the 
fruit of elaborations, regularly undergo modifying changes. This “life of forms”, 
for the sciences as it is spoken of for the arts
7
, must obviously be a constitutive 
dimension of any “formal epistemology”. We therefore feel important to make an 
inventory of this dimension, while maintaining in our approach, in the present 
contribution, a main concern to forms, to the “logic of forms”, to their analysis 
and their meanings, rather than to their historical circumstances, but without 
ignoring for all that the reality and the necessity of the changes which they 
emcompassed.  
 This is the reason why we shall begin this essay to “problematize” a 
“formal epistemology” with a reflection on the “thought of changes”. We shall 
examine thenafter the notion of “epistemic operation”, that shows itself, at both 
theoretical and meta-theoretical levels, as instrumental for the creation of new 
forms. Then we shall consider the features of the form and of the formal, and the 
relations they entertain with knowledge contents, and also the notion of object, 
considered as tributary to a subject's decision and to conventional choices. We 
shall conclude with questions about the link between “epistemic operations” thus 
specified and the idea of algorithmic function for knowledge statements, which 
will lead us to emphasize how a naturalistic conception of representation entails 
the risk of reductionism. 
 
 
2 
 
EPISTEMOLOGY  
AND THOUGHT OF CHANGES 
 
 Einstein remarked that progress in physics leads to theoretical 
representations that are increasingly distant from the immediate form of our 
apprehension of reality. This is true also for other types of sciences and 
knowledges. Only, perhaps, disciplines whose mode of expression is narration - 
this concerns essentially history -, require a type of intelligibility that remains in a 
direct close contact with subjective impressions and immediate sensations, from 
which the facts of a reconstituted past are reactivated. (But even this does not 
                                            
7
 See, for example, the classical work of Henti Focillon on the history of art, La vie des formes 
(Focillon [1981]). Actually, many recent or less recent books titles on esthetics and on the art call 
for the word “form”. The question of the relation between form and signification is obviously a 
central one in the domain of arts. 
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forbid a comprehension informed of more abstract and reflected elements, that go 
along with operations of judgement, with attributions of meaning). 
 Such a distance compels anybody who is still convinced that the 
elaborations of scientific knowledge aim to represent reality - reality of the natural 
world for natural sciences, social and human reality for the others, and it is still 
reality of the world
8
 -, to take in consideration the increasingly numerous 
mediations laid between representative thought and its object. The successive 
states of these mediations can be traced back through history : it is possible to 
identify stages for them, considering each particular knowlege, enrooted in an 
overall culture and entertaining with the others contemporary knowledges 
relationships of mutual reciprocity. At each such stage, these knowledges and the 
culture in which they are embedded compose an organic piece of stuff in which 
types or norms of comprehension (or intelligibility) are determined. The question 
of the intelligibility of the world and of the nature of scientific knowledge is 
therefore inseparable from the consideration of their historical states. This 
consideration does not nevertheless imply any fundamental relativism that would 
deny or minimize the role and function of reason. One must admit as a truth about 
facts the existence of forms of knowledge and of justifications for reasoning that 
differ the ones from the others according to historical times and cultures. But this 
truth itself is liable of a rational, “scientific”, investigation. 
 This remark, whose implications about the nature of the scientific 
knowledge we examine elsewhere
9
, aims only at underlining the importance and 
the extension of the question of the relationship between a new knowledge and the 
“tradition” in which it appears and, consequently, between future knowledge and 
present knowledge. Such a question stands at the basement of the considerations 
presented in what follows, and therefore widely overruns the case of present 
science as known to us, and to which we shall restrain ourselves here. It is 
notwithstanding fundamental to keep this dimension in mind, and to be aware that 
the scientific knowledge in which we are located is not conatural to us, but is the 
result of elaborations that are dependent on historical circumstances. Our attempts 
to give some purely formal and rational representation of it are themselves 
constructions, elaborations, that carry a part of contingency and of convention. 
 If the concern with formal and structural aspects, in which we are 
mainly interested here, has to omit, in a first stage, the consideration of historical 
circumstances, it nevertheless has to take as one of its starting facts the moving 
and evolutive nature of knowledge, that is to say the question of the changes 
affecting not only the objects of our representations, but also the modalities of 
these  representations, up to our very manner to conceive them. Such changes 
affect equally, and possibly even more, the other areas of knowledge and of 
human experience that are not reducible to the scientific knowledge, such as 
aesthetics or moral, those other pillars of any culture, linked also, albeit 
differently, to the use of reason - and also to those other “classical” functions of 
thought that are imagination and memory. 
                                            
8
 In the case of mathematics it is also question of a reality, but it is an idea-like reality. One finds as 
well for them a larger distance taken from the intuitive forms of their origins, that were directly 
related to the sensorial experience. 
9
  Paty [1999a].  
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 In many areas of contemporary scientific knowledge, the ways in 
which one conceives what a phenomenon is, the object to which it refers or the 
explanation given to it, differ appreciably from the previous conceptions and 
practices, including those to which we ourselves have been educated. However, 
although we are conscious of these changes, since we experience them, we do not 
know yet how to interprete them, that is to say, as what and how do they modify 
our current manner of thinking and speaking
10
. This, indeed, would be a priori 
rather difficult to know by remaining inside that traditional thought. We are living 
these changes before knowing how to think them. It is however unavoidable for 
science, and it is essential for philosophy, to undertake somehow to think them. Is 
it possible, right now, to know something more, and to formulate the new thought 
required by the changes that we nowadays live, that are accomplished under our 
eyes ? 
 A first issue is to know what is to be hoped in this direction. The 
present situation is not entirely new : it has precedents, from which some lessons 
can be drawn. And firstly, that scientific thought is not isolated, that epistemic 
changes are only fully intelligible when considered inside a more general 
framework… And also that attention to these changes can be instructive without 
leading necessarily to a global view. Our ambition here must be kept modest, and 
still possibly fertile, otherwise generating mere illusions.  
 The modifications of representations uncovered by contemporary 
science are rich also of more positive teachings. We shall restrict ourselves here in 
evoking those of physics, but it would be possible to propose similar 
considerations for biology, geology, cosmology, mathematics, and social and 
human sciences as well. For instance, the theory of the relativity has shown the 
necessity to think anew and to rebuild notions that were considered the most 
obvious ones and the deepest anchored in our cognitive structures, such as space 
and time. The theory of the relativity (special and general) has also shown the 
necessity to re-examine what a physical theory is, as a symbolic, conceptual and 
formal construction, and to think more appropriately the particular role, in this 
construction, of mathematics - a science of pure forms that pertains 
notwithstanding to a real world of these forms
11
.  
 Awareness of necessities of this kind is not radically new and has not 
appeared only with contemporary physics. We know, indeed, that the space-time 
continuum, that is the basis of the use of differential equations and stands as the 
foundation of all field theories, is an abstract entity elaborated by thought, and that 
its justification does not hold to some evidence of the intuition. The justification 
lays in part in the operative character of this built notion, that allows to describe 
and explain relevant phenomena. It lays, for another part, a fundamental and 
constitutive one, in the logic of a “mathematized” representation, first of space 
then of time, that guides our schemas of intelligibility, and that is itself not an a 
priori but the result of an elaboration process
12
.  
 However, is is not actually a discovery that the space-time continuum 
is a mental, conceptual and symbolic construction, of which we are not assured 
                                            
10
 Mugur-Schächter (1993, 1995, 1996).  
11
 See Paty [1988a, 1993]. 
12
 Paty [1994c]. 
MICHEL PATY  EPISTEMIC OPERATIONS AND FORMAL EPISTEMOLOGY 6 
that the basic elements correspond to something truly real. It has been known 
since, at least, the science of mechanics of material point and differential 
quantities, based on magnitudes that, while being of physical scope, are idea-like 
(“idéelles”), and show as ideal abstractions of suppositious realities. This theory 
proved nevertheless extremely fertile through the efforts of physico-
mathematicians and theoretical physicists, so as to conclude that it exceeds the 
schematic character of a mere ideality - mathematically convenient, if not always 
clear (as for such concepts as material point, fluxions and differentials), and far 
from real (in the sense of common realities). They did it on the basis of newtonian 
mechanics, with its general laws or principles, its relationships and its concepts, 
possibly reformulated, completed or generalized, and by extending it to complex 
solid bodies and to fluids, and also to gravitational attractions beteween more than 
two bodies. But they did it also by discussing - permanent concern of the 
epistemologist scientists
13
 - the conditions of validity and the limits of application 
of these mathematical concepts in formulating physical magnitudes.  
 As for the changes occurred with quantum physics, these are also far 
from having been fully evaluated, at the level of the properly physical meaning of 
the theory as well as on the level of its cognitive impacts. Very early, physicists 
have been themselves preoccupied to generalize from it a methodology for 
physical theory and a philosophy of knowledge. But the worry to afford these new 
and remarkably fertile scientific perspectives a legitimacy that was in risk to be 
denied has fixed prematurely, and in a rigid way, the allowance of the 
interpretations. The conceptual difficulties raised in physical argumentation, in 
theoretical problematization and in epistemological analysis, were buried under 
the automatic replies of a shaped-on-measure philosophy. It was, indeed, 
necessary to reconsider, in the light of knowledges about the new phenomenal 
area, categories whose function had seemed to be definitively acquired, such as 
those of causality or determinism, and even those of observation, of object and of 
objectivity. But many others at the same time were omitted, and in particular 
concepts that could possibly be as much fundamental, such as those of state of a 
physical system and of magnitude characterizing such a state, and also the nature 
of the probability linked to the state. The quantum formalism gave mathematical 
definitions of concepts, but the “interpretation” was letting unclear their deep 
relationship with a direct physical meaning, by denying from the start any 
relevance to such a question, in the name of the alleged philosophical reasons
14
.  
 The recent debates on the meaning of non-local separability for 
quantum systems
15
 and the remaining doubts on the exact status and content of the 
“principle of reduction of the wave packet” (or quantum problem of 
measurement
16
) show remaining zones of obscurity in the question of the physical 
meaning of the quantum theory statements. This theory, in any case, is not 
restricted to quantum mechanics, and extends to quantum field theories which are 
today of a considerable importance, entailing in the long range implications at the 
                                            
13
 From d'Alembert to Mach, Boltzmann, Einstein…  
14
 Paty [1999d, h ; in press, a].  
15
 Cf., f. inst., Bell [1987], Paty [1986], d'Espagnat [1994], Shimony [1993], Cohen, Horne & 
Stachel [1997a and b]. 
16
 Cf., in particular, Wheeler & Zurek [1983]. 
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level of the conceptual meanings
17
.  
 For this reason, when we shall evoke the general lessons to draw from 
quantum physics, we shall not mean the “philosophy of quantum mechanics” with 
the usual sense of this expression, that refers to Bohr's “complementarity” or to its 
variants according to others physicists, insofar as they put theoretical and 
conceptual criticism under the dependence of a philosophy of the observation. We 
shall mean, by these general lessons, all the theoretical, epistemological and 
philosophical questions raised by the knowledge of quantum phenomena, that 
constitutes one of the most important chapters of present physics
18
.  
 Likewise, other contemporary physical theories have unusual 
implications on relationships that were usually considered as direct ones, but that 
actually require rigorous critical evaluations about the meaning of the concepts at 
stake. Consider, for example, the determinism-prevision close link, that is no 
longer relevant with the present theory of non-linear dynamical systems and 
“chaotic” phenomena. In such a case one should possibly distinguish between 
prevision, that deals with the description of a moving body running along its 
trajectory, by using space-time variables - concepts that loose here a great part of 
their fruitfulness -, and prediction, that is still provided indeed by the theory, but 
with respect to other variables - global ones, for example -, and to other concepts, 
such as that of “strange attractor” in the theory of dynamical systems 19- that show 
as being characteristic of this kind of phenomena.  
 Epistemological re-evaluations therefore are still strongly needed if 
one wants to understand new knowledges according to the overall consistence of a 
wider intelligibility, such a deeper understanding going possibly along with 
reformulations. They obviously occur after these new knowledges have already 
been instaured, and they only come out from precise, “differential”, analyses of 
each of these knowledges considered as a specific one. One is then often surprised 
to see, in the transformations that have taken place, similar structural lines with 
respect to some characters, although they concern areas of knowledge that might 
be very different. One should consider, however, that such features show only in 
precise case studies, and that these rapprochements are not immediately visible to 
us. Many decantings are necessary before they impose themselves to the attention. 
And one generally inclines, in a first stage, to see in them mere coincidences, and 
pure analogy appears rightly as too weak an argument to lead to somewhat 
fundamental considerations
20
. 
 One may wonder, however, whether a point of view or an axis for 
research would exist, from which it would have been possible to stand right from 
the start, and that would afford an overall perspective on the facts and problems to 
which the precise (i.e. “regional”) epistemology of these theories is confronted : a 
perspective that would be able to grasp together something of their wealth and 
variety, while giving at the same time an insight of the main structural lines that 
organize them according to some overall intelligibility, more unifying and 
synthetic. Getting at such a point of view might allow to better overcome the 
                                            
17
 Paty [1988a], chap. 8.  
18
 Cf. in particular, Paty [1999c, d & h ; in press, a & b].  
19
 Ruelle [1989, 1991].  
20
 On analogy, see Paty [in press, d].  
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required changes in the organization of knowledge, to stress their main directions, 
to sketch a reasoned inventory of them, and perhaps to anticipate other ones.  
 Such an anticipation is not unthinkable, from the consideration of 
regularities or trends. One can, indeed, question the reason of such similarities, 
analogies and convergences, as observed in transformations occurred in different 
regions of knowledge, and to strive to bring them to some morphological feature 
that wrapped already these knowledge, as a kind of preset and predetermined 
conditioner : this latter, of which we were not conscious previously, was doomed 
to manifest itself at last. If such is the case, a previous examination, performed in 
a more systematic way, would have possibly been able to detect it without being 
in need to wait the contingent occurrence of the events. Such considerations 
would cling on a kind of meta-epistemology still to invent, if only it would be 
possible. They would be, for the epistemology of theoretical representations, a 
kind of an analogue of what would have been, to Hermann Minkowski's eyes, an 
priori mathematical theory of space-time if it had been developed before the 
physical theory of special relativity
21
. Let us already notice that hypotheses of this 
kind seem to be nourished by a wholly rational conception of the theories and 
knowledges under consideration and of their link to the meta-theories liable to 
frame them. It would still remain, anyhow, to specify what is to be understood by 
“rational conception”, compatible with some allowance necessary for invention. 
Or, otherwise, would invention be merely only the “pragmatic” way of access to a 
progress of knowledge that would be fated in some absolute necessity ? 
 At all events, and without anticipately prejudging the replies to these 
questions, such considerations arouse the idea to bestow a particular attention, in 
these problems of readjustments and maybe also already at the elaborating phase, 
to what is set under the species of the “operative” and of the “formal”. It is 
nevertheless still necessary to specify what is meant by these words, before trying 
to settle some marklands for a reflection on what one can possibly expect from it.  
 
 
3.  
 
EPISTEMIC OPERATIONS  
 
 We shall call “epistemic operation” an act of thought (or a series of 
such acts) through which a body of knowledge is constituted, be or not the nature 
of this act consciously perceived during the constitution of this knowledge. It can 
let itself be recognized as such in a further stage of the reflection, from the study 
of  contents and procedures of knowledge in an given area.  
 A simple example of epistemic operation, taken from the methods of 
contemporary physics, is the search for invariants in establishing a physical 
theory : for example, a lagrangean that is Lorentz' invariant is suited to the 
conditions of special relativity ; or that is invariant under a given “gauge” 
symmetry  operation  considered as fundamental for some kind of dynamics of the 
                                            
21
 Minkowski [1907, 1908].  
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interactions of “quantum” particles. This practice of physicists has become usual 
since the adoption of general relativity and of quantum physics, in the years 1920-
1930. But its origin can be found in the mémoire on the dynamics of electron (“La 
dynamique de l'électron”) composed in 1905 by Henri Poincaré22, when the latter 
planned to build a theory of gravitation modified with respect to that of Newton 
by imposing to it the condition of “covariance”, or invariance of the equations 
expressing laws under the “Lorentz' transformations” of space and time 
coordinates, and that means the submission to the principle of (special) relativity. 
This theoretical practice is related with the importance taken in physics since then 
by the notion of group of transformation, of symmetry or of invariance, subtended 
by the corresponding mathematical theory.  
 This importance has been fully understood with Einstein's theory of 
general relativity, and has received a first formal systematization with the theorem 
of (Emmy) Noether
23
. It afterwards has guided the elaboration of quantum 
mechanics and, later on, of the quantum field theory, up to the recent 
developments about the fundamental interaction fields obeying “gauge symmetry 
(or invariance)”. 
 By imposing itself, this “epistemic operation” has considerably 
modified the practice and the conception of physical theory. It is easy to 
formulate, once one knows it as justified ; but to account for its establishment is 
not liable of a simple scheme of explanation, unless distorting or ignoring 
historical reality, made of “facts that resist”. One cannot see it as a natural 
evidence that was required only because we conceive it so well afterwards (after 
its “invention”) without needing other justification. If it seems to be required in 
our retrospective look, it is because this latter is situated in a conceptual universe 
that took it as a reference, in a continuation of  reorganizations of the knowledges 
and of the theoretical method of physics. But it is possible to trace back its origin 
inside the structural and conceptual changes occurred in physics at the beginning 
of XXth century. It was, in a first moment, invented, in a world of thought still 
marked by others conceptions and practices, through circumstances and for 
reasons that belong to historical study and, more precisely, to historical 
epistemology.   
 This example is suitable to make us see rather clearly, thanks to its 
relative simplicity, that we should distinguish two levels with respect to the object 
of our research : on the one  hand, the level of epistemic operations in the 
scientific work properly speaking (here, the formulation of invariants in 
expressing laws and physical theories) and, on the other hand, the level of the 
same operations considered “to the second degree”, under the species of 
procedures that were concluded in stating the first ones, and whose formulation 
implies an historical aspect. This second level is that of the constitution of 
epistemic operations, of their elaboration, and it is hardly reducible to descriptions 
of simple operations. It has to do with the question of the formation of new ideas, 
of creation, in a general way, of “novelty” in science and, so to speak, with the 
question of the “emergence” of new forms in the cognitive thought.   
 One can consider also as epistemic operations the fact of reasoning in 
                                            
22
 Poincaré [1905b].  
23
 Nœther [1918a & b].  
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the framework of some logical structures and of some categories of thought that 
inform our “interpretations”, our manner to conceive the “meanings” of concepts 
and of theoretical statements. For example, concerning the propositions of a 
physical theory : an idea of causality, a specific understanding of determinism, the 
meaning ascribed to the concept of probability. Such ideas have repercussions as 
to the manner in which a problem is processed, this manner being possibly 
common to searchers and specialists in a given period, or likewise differing 
according to the individuals or the schools of thought. But they concern even 
more the way in which these knowledges are understood and justified. Moreover, 
this way is determinant as to the dynamics of the thought planning to go farther or 
not. For instance, the notion of “theoretical completeness”, aroused by general 
relativity and by quantum physics, uncovers a program of research in view of a 
further physical theory, program that is qualified by the position adopted with 
respect to it
24
. None of the two mentioned theories is complete in the strong sense 
(of a self-generation of its objects), which is indeed that one of the present 
attempts at unifying field theories, and the question is actually to know whether 
they are complete in a weaker sense (are they sufficient for describing ascribed 
properties of their objects ?)
25
: such was, to Einstein, a fundamental condition 
required when endeavouring to go farther in a unifying description of physical 
objects.  
 Results obtained in a given science might challenge epistemic 
operations that would have otherwise been considered obvious. Such has been the 
case with the notion of causality that has been modified by the theory of special 
relativity which, by obliging to distinguish between the “space” and the “time” 
regions of the light cone
26
, has entailed changes in our conception of the 
relationship between cause and effect. All the regions of the space-time diagram 
are not equivalent : if the “time region” is physical, the “space region” is non 
physical (there is no possible causality relationship between its hyperpoints). 
Henri Poincaré himself asserted it, with regard to his own ideas, concerning 
Minkowski's space-time
27
. 
 On another hand, the notion of “probability amplitude” of quantum 
mechanics entails, if one thinks to it, a modification of the idea that we may frame 
of probabilities in physical theory. Probability is, without other specification, a 
mathematical notion. It is generally identified, when used in physics, to a 
frequency of events or, more exactly, to the limit of such a frequency, according to 
the law of great numbers. The construction of quantum theory makes use of it in 
an indirect way, through the “probability amplitude” that the wave function or the 
state vector is. Such a denomination reminds the physical meaning of a concept 
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 Paty [1988b & in press, f].   
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 Such was the essence of the “EPR argument” (Einstein, Podolsky & Rosen [1935]) ; see Paty 
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The former is the region of causal relationships between space-time points, the latter is that of 
acausal relationships (“non physical” region). 
27
 Poincaré [1912]. Cf. Paty [1996]. This was shortly after Paul Langevin had discussed, in 
Poincaré's presence, in philosophical meetings, the physical implications of the new relativist 
conceptions on causality  (Langevin [1911 a and b] ; cf. Paty [1996a, in press, f and g]). 
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that, in itself, is alien to the mathematical theory of probability and that, from the 
mathematical point of view, has the form of a vector of a Hilbert space. The 
“probability amplitude” provides theoretical probabilities, that are put afterward in 
relation with experimental frequencies of events.  
 But as the theory bears the meaning of its magnitudes (essentially 
through their relationships) before any effectuation of experiment (this latter 
providing only knowledge of their particular values), the probability obtained 
from the amplitude of probability possesses a theoretical meaning that is not 
reduced to that of the result of a given experiment, i.e. to the meaning of a 
frequency. It makes  therefore sense to speak of the probability of an individual 
event with a theoretical and physical content, such as self-interference for one 
single photon, as Dirac anticipated it already in 1930
28
, and this meaning differs 
from the probability of a cast of dice, that “is exhausted” by the dice being cast. I 
use here the verb “to exhaust” with a meaning that does prejudice on the 
independence of the probabilities of successive casts (“Un coup de dés jamais 
n'abolira le hasard”, “A cast of dice never will abolish chance”, Mallarmé). I mean 
that a single event concerning a classical magnitude is self-sufficient. On the 
contrary, measuring a singular quantum process through registering an event of a 
classical type lets unaffected, virtual-like, the spectral probability distribution of 
the magnitude under consideration. Both come into coïncidence, or better in 
correspondence, only when one gets interested in the results of mesurement for 
magnitudes conceived with classical conditions. Up to the very moment of the 
measure, the theoretical probability in the quantum sense (as given in the 
probability amplitude) carries all the information on the possible spectrum of the 
basis states, with the corresponding (numerical) probabilities. The possibility of 
the connection, and the result when it is performed, is sometimes expressed with 
the words “potentiality” or “propensity”29 that are, actually, nothing more than 
intuitive substitutes for a conceptual jump : the jump existing between classical 
magnitudes endowed with numerical values and quantum magnitudes whose form 
is more complex
30
. 
 We shall discuss later on the question to know whether epistemic 
operations are to be identified with algorithms. We shall have before to make 
clear what we mean by the word “formal” in the expression “formal 
epistemology” : we would like to show how this notion itself largely overflows 
that of algorithm. We will hinder equally to some extent on the notion of “object”, 
that allows to specify the purpose of a formal epistemology with respect to a 
general aspect of epistemic operations.  
 
 
4. 
                                            
28
  Dirac [1930]. See Paty [1999h ; in press, a].  
29
 Heisenberg used to speak of “potentiality” and Popper of “propensity” (f. inst., Popper 
[1935]1968, [1982]). We let aside here the various interpretations that have been proposed for 
probability in this context, from Werner Heisenberg's “potentialities” to Karl Popper's 
“propensities” : note that these notions, as interesting as they might be to point at a problem, are 
purely “intuitive” and vague.  
30
 Paty [in press, c, a & b]. 
MICHEL PATY  EPISTEMIC OPERATIONS AND FORMAL EPISTEMOLOGY 12 
 
TRYING TO DEFINE A 
“FORMAL EPISTEMOLOGY” 
 
 In the classical sense, formal opposes to material, as for example with 
Aristotle's formal cause (bearing on the idea or on the essence), or in the 
antagonistic couple of form and matter, or else in the most current meaning of the 
word “formalism” (the expression “purely formal” means : without real content, 
in the sense of a “material” one)31. This opposition, exploited by scholastics, 
refers to the form the relations existing between the elements of an operation of 
the understanding, whatever be the matter, or the meaning, of these last. Form 
with this acception is the source of an expression such as formal relationship, 
used for algebra and qualifying relationships that are valid for all numbers 
fingered by literal symbols
32
. It takes part also in a terminology used to designate 
laws - the form of the law -, and, in philosophy, for example in kantian 
philosophy, the laws of thought (pure forms of the sensible intuition or a priori 
forms of the sensibility - time and space -, forms of the understanding - categories 
-, forms of reason - ideas). In a different, more recent, sense aroused by 
Gestalttheorie - theory of the form in psychology -, the form is what obliges to 
consider an element as part of an aggregate, of a totality, participating of its 
structure and of its laws. 
 By borrowing to this variety of acceptions, we come closer to a sense 
able to be directly used, bypassing the opposition between form and content, in an 
attempt to get at the fundamental characteristics of the gnoseological approach of 
knowledge contents. Gilles-G. Granger speaks of “formal contents” for 
mathematics, to distinguish them from the sciences of the empirical world, and at 
the same time to get them nearer : they are not empty forms, they also have 
contents, that can be attained at by their relationships as being forms that do not 
reduce to tautologies nor to mere logical expressions
33
. The formal, in this 
acception, is not identified to the purely logical which is, as for itself, empty of 
content. It does not oppose to content, and we shall have precisely to clarify the 
relationship of the formal and the content - some aspects of this will appear in the 
discussion of the notion of object. 
 Formal opposes to something of the kind of the empirical particular, to 
mere phenomenic description of objects, even if the latter's features were obtained 
by a theoretical approach in a natural science. Mathematical physics shows under 
a number of respects as a formal appoach, when compared indeed with 
experimental physics, but with theoretical physics as well, although it rather often 
converges to it, in such a way that both periodically come to an identification (as 
in analytical mechanics exposed by Joseph Louis Lagrange and Rowland 
Hamilton
34
, or  in Hermann Minkowski's theory - “formulation” - of special 
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 Lalande [1926, 13th ed., 1980] : articles Cause, Formalisme, Forme, Formel.  
32
 “Formal” calls for “actual” (as in the ancient and scholastic acception) and for “general” (as in 
algebra). 
33
 Granger [1994, 1995].  
34
 See Paty [1994b, 1999b]. 
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relativty
35
, or in Einstein's theorry of general relatvity, and in some presentations 
of quantum mechanics (notably those of Hermann Weyl and John von 
Neumann
36
), and also in many developments of gauge field theories (from the 
works of Yang and Mills, up to the most recent researches on quantum 
gravitation
37
). Mathematical physics deals with the formal relations between the 
mathematical quantities that supposedly concern physics. It is a formal of a 
mathematical nature, by opposition to the physical content which is primarily the 
worry of theoretical physics. But the opposition is only relative, and the noticed 
periodic identifications between mathematical physics and theoretical physics are 
nothing more than a indication that, as “formal” as they be with respect to nature, 
mathematical relationships are not alien to it, to the extent that they constitute the 
very form of the descriptions that theoretical physics gives of nature. In these 
privileged circumstances, the form succeeds in being the very expression of the 
content.  
 Taking again the example of invariants evoked previously, these last 
are caught by thought as formal relationships, but that express at the same time 
general and fundamental properties of physical system and of the magnitudes 
describing them in the physical theory. Far from being external and superficial, 
the formal relationship is therefore capable to express contents, bearers of 
meanings : it is a privileged way, maybe sometimes the only way, to express these 
meanings. In this manner Poincaré considered “mathematical analogies”38, and 
Einstein “formal analogies”39, which happen to be equivalent (mathematics are 
the formal for the physicist). Poincaré and, some time later, Einstein did not 
hesitate in speaking of a “heuristic of the mathematical formalism”, that drifts 
physical thought, precisely because this formalism, in the cases which they 
considered, was informed of, and even impregnated with, the physical meanings 
that it served to express
40
.  
 Although the nature and the role of the formalism in mathematical 
physics advises us somehow that attention to the formal is not exclusive of 
contents and meanings, this does not tell us yet what one should conceive as being 
the purpose of a “formal epistemology”. 
 Does one mean to study the formal aspects of epistemology as, for 
example, other people study under their formal aspects such or such realizations 
in an area of artistic expression ? Of that kind, the literary critical analysis bearing 
on the form for the poetry of Baudelaire or of Mallarmé. But one can also 
conceive a concern for the form that does not aim only to describe or to 
characterize existing “styles” of work or thought41, but whose worry is to find new 
forms of expression, or new manners to generate new contents - perhaps new 
meanings -, through a privileged attention to the form, for example by imposing 
formal constraints to achieve a work. This tendency is frequent in contemporary 
art, in painting, in music or in literature. The worry might also be to practice work 
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 Minkowski [1907, 1908] ; cf. Walter [1996]. 
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 Weyl [1928], von Neumann [1932]. 
37
 Notably, Ashtekhar [1989]. Cf. Kouneiher [1998]. 
38
 Poincaré [1897]. Cf. Paty [in press, d].  
39
 Einstein [1912]. Cf. Paty [1993], chap. 4, p. 164-172  
40
 Paty [1993], chap. 5. 
41
 On the notion of style in science, see Granger [1968], Paty [1990], chap. 4, [1993a], chap. 1. 
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on the form in order to generate original expressions, such as the exercises of the 
Oulipo group
42
, submitting poetical or literary writing to formal constraints
43
 that 
produce aesthetic innovations and effects of meaning.  
 The epistemological reflection deals partly about forms, and takes 
itself forms that depend on the modalities of its approach and that are connected, 
in a somehow more direct and compelling manner than aesthetical forms, to 
questions of meaning : a meaning existing beforehand, but non necessarily already 
given, and which is, precisely, to be put under day light from beneath facts and 
appearances. This reflection is not, for sure, free creation of form ; as a critical 
study by the thought of an “object” existing outside of it, i.e. as scientific 
knowledge, it shares with this last the external existence of its object, and bears 
constraints that hold to this exteriority. Then, precisely, it is to the exteriority of 
the object of scientific knowledge - including mathematics - that one may rightly 
refer essentially the formal constraints of its representations. Is it possible to have 
a similar situation, to some degree, with epistemology as a reflexive knowledge of 
science ? We shall let aside, for the moment, the question of formal constraint 
possibly imposed also by the gnoseological structures of the knowing subject. 
 A “formal epistemology” has, so to speak, to be in connivance with its 
object, and this excludes any game on formalisms that would be alien to this 
object, and it excludes as well any identification with a formalism that would not 
be directly relevant to it (this raising already the question of algorithms and of 
exercising one's thought with arbitrary models). It can focus on studying forms 
(and formalisms) that characterize scientific knowledge, and the operations as 
well by which these forms are established (these operations we called epistemic). 
This being considered, the margin still remains large to define the manner, or 
manners, to practice it, which incidentally is an advantage : it remains a priori 
possible to choose the manner that seems to us the most fruitful, the most 
adequate and satisfactory with respect to the object in view, i.e. to the foreseen 
purpose.  
 On another hand, formal is not to be identified with quantified, as we 
are informed by the very mathematization of physical magnitudes, that invites us 
to distinguish, among the consequences of this mathematization, the qualitative - 
understood in the modern sense, and not in that of Aristotle and of the scolastics -, 
in the disposition and the order of magnitude, reflecting the conceptual idea, and 
the quantity, whose informations are of another kind
44
. And again, formalization 
does not mean schematization - similarly, to describe theoretically the form of an 
animal is not to reduce it to its skeleton -, but it concerns the fact and the manner 
of taking a form. The question of the form under which scientific knowledge and 
the particular sciences show in a factual way, as constituted and as being in a 
constituting process, let see that form has to do with intelligibility.  
 What is the intelligibility given by a given scientific knowledge with 
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 Ouvroir de littérature potentielle  (Opening device of potential litterature), created in 1960, 
animated notably by Italo Calvino, François Le Lionnais, Georges Pérec, Raymond Queneau, 
Jacques Roubaud (Oulipo [1977]). 
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 See, for inst., La disparition, by Georges Pérec (Pérec [1969]), a novel written without using the 
letter e, a vowel yet so much frequent….  
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 See Paty [1994a]. 
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the form it takes ? Furthermore, if a narrow link exists between form and 
structure, it appears equally wishable to distinguish the two, form being more 
untied, elastic and manageable than structures
45
. The form expresses the structure, 
but only partly : it also expresses others characters, compatible with the structure. 
On the other hand, a same piece of knowledge may dress itself with various 
forms, and one might wonder whether there corresponds different intelligibilities 
for these forms. This question, linked to that of “interpretations”, appears actually 
as a fundamental one : it is possible to see there one of the key-articulations of a 
“formal epistemology”. 
 “Epistemology of formal knowledge”, “epistemology of form”, 
“formal epistemology”… This metascientific approach of the function of form in 
knowledge can be seen as a methodology by its heuristic-oriented choice. It 
remains to know to what extent it can pretend to generate norms of reasoning, for 
example of conceptualization, allowing to reproduce or to anticipate inventions 
(that are precisely inventions of forms). That is not evident a priori considering 
what we know up to now about understanding and creating concepts. To 
reconsider a concept is, in some way, to recreate it, and this is produced in the unit 
of a singular, subjective, thought - considering here subjectivity in the epistemic 
sense, i. e. as being the center of the acts of reason.  
 These reasonings creating new forms, do not only operate rules, 
numerable and which could be classified according to some typology, but are 
inscribed inside a consciousness that mobilizes, in the acts of the understanding, 
many other instances than only the identified elements of the questions to solve. 
By these other instances, we do not mean psychology or sociology, of which it is 
needed to be freed when considering the formal that worries us here - such a rule 
must be obeyed also in epistemology when one deals with the scientific contents 
of concept and theories -, but we mean factors that are not made explicit and are 
generally let unconscious, which play likewise their part in the economy of the 
acts of reason
46
.  
 We are led hencefore to situate formal epistemology and epistemic 
operations with respect to the judgements and to the decisions (or to the choices) 
set by the subject of knowledge, insofar as it is an epistemic subject, and therefore 
to specify what remains of the subject - unique center of intelligibility - for an 
“objective” knowledge that wants to abstract, as a matter of principle, the 
singularity of the subjective by requiring only operation, process and content, 
“without a subject”. Although knowledge is established, evaluated, 
communicated, through acts of creation and of judgement, a subject as the center 
of these acts is undeniably required by an epistemology, even a formal one. 
Without it, knowledge would bear on contents without the intelligibility or, at 
best, with an anonymous and abstract “intelligibility” : but one is in right to 
wonder whether the very notion of content would then be only conceivable. Could 
a knowledge content be merely schematic ?  
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  On structure in science, see for ex., Stegmuller [1973, 1979]. On structure for history, cf. 
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 The presence of a subject in filigree appears under some elements that, 
upstream or downstream of any knowledge, qualify the conditions, the effects or 
the modalities of these acts. We only mention them here, and their study belongs 
to epistemology in the general sense, structural or historical : conditions of 
possibility
47, fields of rationality, styles, programs, intelligibility, intuition…48  
The difference, here, between formal epistemology and epistemology in the 
general sense is that, if the second takes these elements as objects for study, the 
first one will only take them into account as something given and conditioning 
that it pretends to transcend or, more exactly, with respect to which it situates by 
searching “structural invariants”. 
  
 
5.  
 
OBJECT AND CONVENTION 
 
 Examining epistemic operations leads, as epistemology in the current 
sense does it also on its own side, to disclose in the operations of knowledge a 
preliminary part of the organization by the understanding, that “prepares” the 
object of knowledge, or rather the conditions of its identification
49
.  
 All sciences, be them exact, natural or social ones, are to-day 
conscious of the necessity to criticize the notion of object, especially by taking 
into account that this object is defined by a separation from the subject that puts 
it : the critique of the notion of object entails, correlatively, that of the notion of 
objectivity. On the one hand, no object can be designated without a mental act or 
an intention of the subject. On the other hand, any object is defined by its 
distinction or its separation from a background against which it stands out. It is 
known also that one must not restrict science, as for the conceptualisation of its 
objects, to characters afforded by common sense : here again, quantum physics has 
allowed to benefit some particularly precise lessons, to which we refer without 
being able to detail them here
50
.  
 Many have often interpreted as a “de-ontologization” of the sciences 
the transformations from objects to relationships that have been characterized 
above all in mathematics, especially since they abandoned a unique idea of 
geometry ; it has been diagnosticated in physics as well due to the 
mathematization of physical theory, and all the more so as physical theory takes 
increasingly the form of a mathematical physics. But the notion of object is not for 
all that abolished in that of mere relationship. To deal, indeed, with relationships 
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 Kant [1781-1987]. 
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 Granger [1968], Lakatos [1970], Zahar [1989], chap. 1, Paty [1988, 1990, 1993], … 
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 The word “preparation”, rightly pointed at by M. Mugur-Schächter (op. cit.), comes from 
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one) was also present in epistemological reflections previous to it ; quantum mechanics has 
contributed in giving it a pecular flavour and a better precision (see, in particular, Margenau 
(1978)).  
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is to deal with elements interplaying trough these relationships : in order to relate, 
something is needed - say : elements - that be related together, even if the nature 
of such “elements” is problematical or relative. At all events are they the “objects” 
of the relationship, and it is in this way that one tends henceforth to conceive the 
very notion of object, in mathematics, and in physics as well.  
 It is true, however, as the movement of setting relationships is 
progressing with increasing degree of formalization and of abstraction of theories, 
that the proper elements or objects of the relationships transform themselves, in 
their turn, in other relationships, at least partly. Elements might be, and in a 
“complete” physical or mathematical theory (even in the weak sense evoked 
earlier), actually are, given in and by the relationship itself (such is eminently the 
case with quantum theory). But, to the extent that the system of these relationships 
is not transparent or tautological, it expresses a structured content that resists 
dissolution into mere relational (we ought here to specify what is meant by that : 
for example, simply relations without things being related). This content that 
resists and that to be known needs to be explored, has therefore an attribute that is 
generally referred to as “reality”. An example as simple and elementary (at least at 
first inspection) as the system of the integer numbers of arithmetics can directly 
illustrate that complexity of relations, that “reality” of some kind that subtends 
them. Even by generating the totality of integers by being given the number 1 as 
unit and the operation of addition  of that unit to itself, and the cumulative 
repetition of this operation, one can not know in advance all their properties, for 
example which of them are prime numbers and their relationships among 
themselves (such as Fermat's “great theorem”). Notice however that the repetition 
of elementary additions in the generating relationship implies that one processes 
not only numbers but numbers of operations on these numbers…, and that the 
mode of generation was simple only apparently. (Notice also that relationship is 
inherent to the mode of generation of numbers, and therefore to the “essence” of 
these latter). 
 Physics provides good examples as well. Take the concept of field, 
once cleared by the special theory of relativity of the material or objectal support 
of ether : the field is defined physically only through the equations of the field. Or 
again, the indistinguishability of identical quantum systems or “particles”, that 
defines at the same time the relationship and the object of this relationship, and 
the symmetries of elementary particle that determine these latter in their 
relationships between them through their fields of interaction (gauge fields)
51
.. 
 It might be more correct to say that it is this very relational that has 
become “as concrete as something real”. If the transformation, that is always 
possible, of elements into others, more relational ones, makes their “objectal” 
nature a more relative one, it remains that their narrow relationship between them 
appears finally as having all the characters of what one conceives as an object, 
endowed with a proper consistency. A nucleus of structured relationships closely 
woven does not leave anything to wish for the notion of object, once this one is 
freed from the substances of ancient metaphysical doctrines. Hence the object, be 
it mathematical or physical (and, by extension, chemical, biological…), loses its 
                                            
51
 Paty [1999c, h ; in press, a]. 
MICHEL PATY  EPISTEMIC OPERATIONS AND FORMAL EPISTEMOLOGY 18 
traditional relation with a directly ontological perspective. The category of 
“being” respectively to it is, if not deleted, at least distanciated from it through 
relational mediations. But predicates of existence, as for them, remain, as their 
criteria are of an epistemological nature. 
 The ambiguities of the word “ontology” do not justify therefore to 
give up the notion of “object”. Furthermore, a representation or a theory is always 
representation or theory of something~: by definition, this “something”, whose 
necessity here is a logical one, is the “object”, that this theory designates. By 
having already oriented the representation or the theory at stake, one has qualified 
this object in some way. It is clearly through an act of the thought that we have 
designated it so as to be described by the representation or the theory. In such an 
act stands a choice, that separates this object from the “rest” and, indicating a 
program, comprises a part of convention, that the object therefore carries with it. 
The conception of objectivity is correlatively affected by this : it is not only given 
(as thought is drifted along by the object), but also decided (according to some 
norms or conditions) and built  as well (in relation with our choices to settle the 
object).  
 The chosen convention depends on the concepts and on the theoretical 
system interweaving them in order to describe the object. It is relative to this 
system, and alternative conventions are thinkable, that do not bear only on the 
theory, but on the totality of the elements of meaning for the theory that are in 
keeping with a definite intelligibility, and whose criteria are themselves partly 
metatheoretical. It urges to study precisely the interplay of these two notions, 
object and convention, that call for requirements of various kinds related to the 
types of representative theories that one might consider. 
 We shall restrain on this to only a few more words. One often gives  
credit to quantum mechanics of having eliminated the notion of object, at all 
events insofar as this last would be thought independently of any act of 
observation and of conceptualization and would preexist to such acts. For sure - 
and it is actually commonly admitted, as previously stated, well beyond quantum 
physics - the object as such has been separated from the rest (or the conditions of 
its separation have been prepared) through an operation of the mind. But this 
“condition of possibility” for thinking the object does not exhaust the description 
one can perform : actually, it only makes it possible by opening the field for its 
realization.  
 One might consider, in this respect, that the specific problem of 
quantum mechanics is that of the nature of the acts - of thought and of operations - 
that are required to get access to the description of the object, or, more exactly, of 
its state. I have tried elsewhere - and here I cannot stretch myself out - to show, 
from this standpoint, that quantum systems and their states can be conceived in 
terms of objects endowed with properties, at the cost of an extension of meaning, 
already realized in the practical understanding of physicists, but not yet explicitly 
admitted, of the notions of physical magnitude and of state function for a system 
described by such magnitudes, beyond their usually accepted meaning of direct 
numerically valued quantity
52
. Notice again only that one could have find, 
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upstream quantum physics, circumstances where “objects”, represented by 
abstract magnitudes, had already lost qualities habitually attributed by common 
sense (such was already the light wave, spreading in all space, or the field without 
the support of an ether, as evoked above). Let us remark also that the concept of 
state function, that entered already Hamilton's mechanics, was suggested to him 
by optics with the application of a principle of minimization - another epistemic 
operation that refers to a more ancient origin -, in mechanics as well as in optics, 
namely the principle of least action.  
 Let us retain the following : one has known how to build a 
representation that can be said to correspond to a kind of object, without knowing 
for all that its deep justification - except that it is operative. (I mean that it suffices 
to anything that is needed to describe the object and the phenomena related to it.) 
We nevertheless know that the possible epistemological difficulties stand rather at 
the level of the - conceptual and theoretical - tool, than at the level of the nature of 
the object whose theory we are dealing with. In fact, the tool has been adjusted 
according to the object it was aimed at : not directly, but through the construction 
and the mediation of a theory adequate to represent it.  
 The operative tool  that the quantum rule, or algorithm, is, has been 
elaborated through its adaptation to the necessity to represent a coherent world of 
objects - the world of quantum objects - liable to give account of quantum 
phenomena. The tool and the elements of the representation are - by the logic of 
their making - made of the same stuff. And the formalism of the state functions 
defined in Hilbert spaces and of operators acting on them, that aim to represent 
quantum systems, is accompanied by its rule, by construction. But at their level, in 
the interplay of relations of their world, the “objects” that these state functions 
designate  - namely, the quantum systems - do not need, in order to be thought, to 
be referred at any time to the tool that, after having constructed them, detects 
them, that is to say to the rule, in terms of statistical probabilities and of reduction. 
They are actually thought accordingly to their designation, that is to say to the 
theoretical formalism itself
53
. In a way, the question of the nature of the tool is not 
so much that of the represented quantum object, than that of the relation between 
the quantum representation and the classical representation adapted to the 
experimental devices
54
. 
 These remarks suggest a movement so to speak opposite to the 
progressive “syntaxization of semantics” which expressed, in the terms of the 
philosophy of language, the mathematization of physical contents, or the 
transformation of the object into the relation
55
. If one considers the effective 
evolution of the question of the interpretation of quantum mechanics since the 
first debates, and the subsequent familiarization acquired in this area by 
physicists, up to the recent knowledges and to the reinterpretations that may be 
consequently formulated, it is tempting to speak of a semantization of the syntax. 
The description of quantum physical systems was conceived previously only by 
means of operations, while it can be given henceforth, accordingly with what we 
have just suggested, in terms of physical systems, conceived as objects having 
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properties (indeed, at the cost of transformations in our definitions of the physical 
magnitudes used to describe such properties).  
 The previous “syntax” remained external to the physical content 
properly speaking, since it was considered as restricted to purely formal means of 
the description, without coming to a decision on the physical existence of these 
systems. A full achievement of the program of the semantization of the theory 
would be to formulate quantum theory as the theory of a category of physical 
objects and of their physical properties. This would be a necessary task before 
going again to new properly physical syntaxizations. (One should be able to 
substitute the axiomatic formulation à la von Neumann
56
, expressed in terms of 
utilization rules of the formalism, by an new equivalent axiomatic formulation in 
terms of physical properties concerning the quantum level).  
 
6.  
 
ALGORITHM AND NATURALISTIC REDUCTION 
OF REPRESENTATION  
 
 The notion of epistemic operation puts naturally the problem to know 
in what measure such operations can be algorithmic ones. One can conceive them 
as such when these are simple operations in the scientific work, such as the case, 
mentioned earlier, of a search of invariants, for example. Albeit, if one can 
conceive algorithmically an already known invariant, it is not obvious to conceive 
an algorithm for a search of invariants. For complex operations bearing on the 
acquisition of more precise knowledge, the answer is much more difficult, and on 
this possibility opinions diverge. The experts in artificial intelligence, and the 
adepts of it, will reply willingly by the affirmative. In the long range, according to 
them, all cognitive operations, including scientific inventions, will be able to be 
reconstituted : they are already proposing many models for it and for relatively 
simple situations, proclaiming its obvious necessity of principle in all cases, and 
sending the skeptics back to the old archaic dualism of matter and mind
57
. Is the 
brain, so do they claim, different from a machine (a neuronal one, indeed) ? 
 One may, actually, estimate that this question, by some aspects, is not 
unprecedented. The cartesian research of a method to get a secured knowledge, or 
that, leibnizian one, of a universal characteristic allowing to formulate in a unique 
and perfectly logical language the totality of knowledge, and even the parti-pris of 
demonstration more geometrico of the statements in Spinoza's Ethics, not to go 
back to Aristotle, testify the permanence of a somewhat similar concern through 
the history of philosophy; at least as for the possibility of a powerful algorithm 
liable of founding, gathering and organizing true knowledges. This wish for 
synthesis by means of a formal unity was not necessarily a reductionist one : it 
was protected, in Descartes, by the dualism of the acted matter and the thinking 
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mind, and the spinozian monism used to let all the room for the specificities of the 
various sciences. The tendency appears to be a quite different one with the modern 
idea of the brain as a machine : the stake here is, actually, not only that one of an 
algorithm for the representation, that would remain inner to it; but its naturalistic 
reduction
58
 - a question on which we cannot extrend ourselves in this 
contribution. 
 The claim of algorithms for the scientific knowledge has had the 
opportunity to be strengthened in our times by the logicist ideas of the 
philosophers of the Vienna and Berlin circles
59
 and of their successors, dissenters 
or not, up to analytic philosophy
60
. For the logical positivists and empiricists, 
science would generate a philosophy of knowledge that would be compelling (the 
so called “scientific philosophy”, presented and supported by Hans 
Reichenbach
61
), a philosophy enrooted in the data of experience taken as the 
fundamental reference for knowledge. The search, with Rudolf Carnap, for an 
inductive logic, be it only a probabilistic one
62
, was subtended by the idea that any 
scientific knowledge can be reduced to a rule, valid everywhere, perhaps in all 
times, that would have to be discovered : and this is also to think of scientific 
knowledge on an algorithmic mode. Asserting confidence in methodology
63
, and 
claiming the normative legitimacy of a “rational reconstruction” of the scientific 
knowledge (Reichenbach, Popper
64
, among others) that allows to correct the 
irrationalities due to the intervention of the subject in a knowledge whose 
vocation is to be an objective one, i.e. a knowledge “without subject”, these 
positions go equally in the same direction.  
 One may also consider as an indication or an effect of this view the 
popperian “third world” of the forms of objective knowledge65 : this impersonal 
universe of ideas is supposed to be that of pure rationality, cleared of all affects 
and of chance, and even of materiality (sent back respectively to the second world 
and to the first one). This world of created forms, without the acts of creation, is 
akin to the reservation or to the museum : a “museum of ideas”, “virtual” before 
the recent common use of the word, where one draws to formulate other ideas, 
and conceivable only related to the two other worlds. This idea harbors, it seems, 
a rather platonician one of purifying the world of ideas from perishable elements 
such as matter, flesh, affects and feelings, that make the individual subject, while 
protecting a logic of the reconstruction that is not very different from the 
algorithmic function. 
 This being said, one will acknowledge that an algorithm, with a 
logical application, is not to be identified per ipse to a machine, for it is not 
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necessarily overlaid with the idea of reproducing the totality of operations of 
knowledge. One has also to take into account a widening of the notion of 
machine, that would include the possibility for new forms or emergent properties 
to appear, concerning material systems as well as the novelty sprang out in the 
space of ideas. But invoking a powerful algorithm or a machine, even with 
organic properties, as being to reproduce or to describe the process of acquisition 
of a fundamentally new representation gives rise to reserves, without any need to 
invoke dualism and holding on the contrary an ontologically monist position : 
these reserves are similar to those one can soundly oppose to reductionism and to 
a naturalistic conception of knowledge and of values. It is possible to emit them 
without denying for all that any interest to “epistemic operations”. 
 It is possible to conceive an epistemic operation generating an 
algorithm, such as that of the invariants considered above or - another example - 
the leibnizian differential calculus, and, once the algorithm has been invented, to 
reorganize or to reconstitute with its help all the ascertained or predictable 
properties of a representation in a chosen referential of meaning. The algorithm 
can demonstrate its fruitfulness in the resolution of many problems, and even 
perhaps contribute to pose new problems and to solve them. But can it make rise, 
by itself, a qualitatively new property or knowledge ? It appears logically possible 
only if the algorithm contains in itself this break relative to its antecedents that 
makes the new. But would not we have quitted, ever since then, the demarcated 
framework of the “epistemic operations” that can be formulated ? 
 A machine to produce some “conceptually new” remains, so far as we 
know, still to be invented. This considered, should we think of such a possibility 
as being absolutely unthinkable for the future ? The question, to which “artificial 
intelligence” would like to give a positive answer, depends on what one can call 
“qualitatively new” : this characteristic escapes, at any event, the content properly 
speaking - i.e. internal -, of a knowledge, referred to its framework of thought and 
situated in the universe of meanings. It is difficult to imagine the existence, or 
even only the possibility, of a “machine to produce sense”, in the common 
acception of these terms, at all events in the absence of a thought that would be at 
the origin of this sense or that could “read” it. 
 Evaluating concepts and their possible character of novelty belongs to 
signification, and until further notice, it is the human thought, fruit of a brain 
inseparable from a body and from a practice of life, and setting aims to itself, by 
will or by desires, that imposes its meanings on the machine. A “machine to 
produce sense” would have to possess such properties, and for sure still others, 
including feelings and psychology : such a machine would then astonishingly look 
like man in society, whose outgrowth by nature has resulted from a very long - 
and maybe improbable - history and whose origin has been lost in the night of 
times : the history of maturations, renewals, transmissions and exchanges, 
resulting from the diversification of the human phylum, biological, social and 
cultural, and from the chance of accidents. 
 As a consequence, the fundamental question is reduced to the 
following one : is it possible to think of an algorithm capable to generate, for 
knowledge, a meaning that would differ from those that are available to us but 
that could appear to us as legitimate, and perhaps more certain as these ones ? It 
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seems that one enters, with this type of problems, in an unending chain of 
implications and in an infinite multiplicity of open ways that the machine will 
have much harm to solve.  
 On the contrary, human thought, that has stemmed from matter, 
indeed, does not calculate all the possibilities as machine does, but cuts across the 
offered combinations and makes its choices well before having exhausted all of 
them
66
. It puts, well simply, the meaning that shows to it  - according to its 
judgment, that is possibly subjective only in some sense - the sudden clearness of 
an intelligibility. That one, be it cartesian evidence, spinozian knowledge of the 
third kind, illumination of the intuition as for Poincaré, Einstein and other 
contemporary thinkers, seems doomed to durably escape reductionist description. 
It is so because this intelligibility must call, if it wants to get foundations, to other 
ones in an endless regressive chain, as with the pascalian  considerations on the 
situation of man's intelligence in the world, leaning on reasons that he believes he 
understands by experience but that, when he questions them, reveal themselves to 
be a bottomless well
67
.  
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